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Edit: okay, I’ve been schooled in the comments. Leaving this up for documentation.
I believe strongly in the is-ought gap. If you start solely with premises about what "is," you cannot reach a logical proof of what "ought to be." You need to have at least one premise about what "ought to be" and work from there. And I believe it works in reverse, too--statements about what "ought to be" cannot be used as your sole proof of what "is."
I propose that "if-then" statements face a similar gap. A simple statement that "X is true" is fundamentally different than a statement that "if X is true, then Y is true." If you start solely with "if X, then Y," then you will never be able to prove Y. Conversely, separately proving that X is true and Y is true does not prove "if X, then Y." The failure of so many ontological arguments is that they start entirely with "if X, then Y" premises while aiming for an "X is true" conclusion.
(Note that this isn't an exact parallel. If X is true, and Y is true, then the statement "if X, then not Y" can be proven false. I don't see a way to prove a falsehood from either side of the is-ought gap.
I believe strongly in the is-ought gap. If you start solely with premises about what "is," you cannot reach a logical proof of what "ought to be." You need to have at least one premise about what "ought to be" and work from there. And I believe it works in reverse, too--statements about what "ought to be" cannot be used as your sole proof of what "is."
I propose that "if-then" statements face a similar gap. A simple statement that "X is true" is fundamentally different than a statement that "if X is true, then Y is true." If you start solely with "if X, then Y," then you will never be able to prove Y. Conversely, separately proving that X is true and Y is true does not prove "if X, then Y." The failure of so many ontological arguments is that they start entirely with "if X, then Y" premises while aiming for an "X is true" conclusion.
(Note that this isn't an exact parallel. If X is true, and Y is true, then the statement "if X, then not Y" can be proven false. I don't see a way to prove a falsehood from either side of the is-ought gap.